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Sectarianization of Places and Movements 
Gilgit-Baltistan, the high mountain area in the north of Pakistan and 
especially its capital Gilgit, is a sectarianized space. Sectarian affiliation is a 
highly significant category for the perception and erdering of places: People 
generally lmow where people of which sectarian affiliation-Shia, Sunni, 
Ismaili, and in Baltistan also Nurbakhshi-live, and villages, urban wards 
or sometimes entire valleys are sectarianly 'tagged'. The spatial sectarian 
segregation is fahly weil known by all people and 'sectarian geographies' are 
also made obvious by visual markers such as flags, banners, graffiti, large 
writings on the mountains, as well as buildings for religious W'orship. The 
sectarian geography is not static though: It is not only that particular places 
are affi.liated with one of the sects or with sectarian conflict but also movement 
and mobilily are affected by and framed within a sectarianized rationality. 
While the term 'sectarian (or religious) movement' is mostly understood 
metaphorically, meaning that social movements are based on or aimed at 
religious affiliation, we will take it literally. In this article we will explore 
relationships between sectarianism and spatial movements in order to not 
only grasp how people perceive, order and occupy space but above allalso to 
understand how they navigate in such space.1 We depart from the hypothesis 
that not only a place is sectarianlzed but also movernent and mobility as 
places are created and delineated by moving within and between them. 2 The 
sectarianization of place, space and movement cannot be separated. 
By sectarianization we refer to social and political processes through 
which the affiliation with particular religious groups acquires more and 
Here we refer to transitory movement, both by car and on foot, in and outside the 
city, as weil as to permanent movement such as shifting residency. 
Cf. Jngold 2009. 
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more significance in various areas of sociallife. 3 The way in which sectarian 
identities and relations between the religious commwrities are imagined are 
contesied and change in history; they have not always been as important as 
they are today. Yet today sectarian affiliation significantly structures people's 
imagll}ations and actions. This for instance means that sectarian identities 
become more important than identities related to kinship, language or 
regional belonging, or that affi.liation with a particular sect becomes a kind 
of premise that to a large extent structures social perception and interaction. 
By using the tenn sectarianization-instead of sectarianism that implies a 
more fi.xed condition-we intend to emphasize the dynamic character ofthese 
processes through which sectarian geographies are produced. Sectarianization 
often includes, but is not restricted to episodes of violence. While violent 
assaults are mostly limited to Sunnis and Shias-lsmailis being involved 
only as sporadic victims---everyday sectarianization, i.e. the application of 
sectarian logic to daily action, concerns the lives of the members of all sects. 
As Khan argues, sectarianism, in a process of structuration, is both formed by 
and in turn affects everyday life. 4 Sectarian logics prevail both in everyday 
life and in special events, such as violent atracks in Gilgit and along the 
highway connecting Gilgit-Baltistan with down-country Pakistan. Sectarian 
violence is enacted in other parts of Paldstan too, but in Gilgit the sectarian 
composition of the town's populations with Shia and Swmi communities of 
almost equal size has made (often violent) conflict a regular manifestation of 
sectarianism. 
Our article focuses foremost on the city of Gilgit, the social and physical 
environment that is most strongly affected by processes of sectarianization. 
But we also refer to movements beyond the city. First we will present abrief 
history of sectarianization in Gilgit. Secondly, we will discuss the connection 
between religious/sectarian polarization and spatial differentiation, before 
we will analyze how people actually move in and between sectarianized 
places and how movement itself becomes sectarianized. 
'Sect' or 'firqa' refers to specific traditions of beliefs and practices of Islam as they 
developed historically. In this article, we consider only the !arger Islamic groups of 
Gilgit-Baltistan, i.e. Shias, Sunnis and Ismailis, although processes of differentiation 
can also be observed within these groups, for example among Sunnis between 
Barelwis and Deobandis. Ismailis are sometimes subsumed under Sbia Islam, 
although Ismailis themselves would hardly ever call themselves Shia. 
Khan 2006: 234. Khan criticizes the narrow standard perceptions of sectarianism 
that define it as either an 'alternative mode of politics' or as pathological effects of 
religious schisms. 
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A Brief History of Sectarianization in Gilgit 
From the beginning, the introduction of!slam to the region of Gilgit-Baltistan 
took place in the shape of spatially and sect-wise differentiated proselytizing 
movements. It can be said !hat Shia Islam was first introduced from Central 
Asia in the North around mid of the 16th century. The lsmailiyya came from 
Badakhshan in the northwest probably in the late 18th century, while Sunni 
Islam came from south and southwest to Gilgit-Baltistan since the early 19th 
century.5 
To some extent, the present geographical distribution of the sects still 
reflects these spatial trajectories of Islamization: The southern district of 
Diamer is exclusively Swmi. Nager in the north and Baltistan in the east is 
mostly Shia (with a smail minority of Nurbalthshis) while Ismailis prevail in 
Hrmza in the north and in Ghizer in the west. However, many geographical 
areas and political districts are mixed: In Baltistan, especially in Skardu, there 
are also SW111is; in Astor we find Shias beside the majority of Sunnis; in 
Ghizer there are Swmis beside the Ismailis; and in the Hrmza-Nager District 
almost all-Ismaili Hunza is spatially juxtaposed to Shia Nager. The city of 
Gilgit, being the political and economic center of the region, which stands 
at the geographic crossroads of movements from all directions, is religiously 
mixed. There are no official and reliable figures as the census counts only 
affi!iation with a 'religion' (i.e. Islam) and not with 'sects' (firqa), but roughly 
estimated the three major sects are almost equally represented in Gilgit. Just 
like the valleys and districts of Gilgit-Baltistan, also in Gilgit city the space 
is subdivided. Although there are some mixed wards too, most are occupied 
by one sect. Wards 'belonging' to Shias or Sunnis are often even considered 
so-called 'no-go areas' for the respective other sect. 
Sectarianism, sectarian violence included, has a long history in the area. 
While people in Gilgit today often insist !hat before the 1980s (or the 1970s) 
there was no sectarian violence in the area, this is not entirely correct-it is 
rather a reflection of the fact that in the recent past sectarianization became 
much more intense. However, British colonial sources from the end of the 
19th century already mentioned violence by Sunnis agairrst Shias. For instance 
John Biddulph, the first British Agent in Gilgit, wrote about the people of 
Chilas: 
5 Rieck 1997. 
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Tough but comparatively recent converts to Islam, they are bigoted 
and fanatical beyond all other Dards, owing, it is said, to Chilas haviog 
been at all times a favourite resort to Moolahs from Swat. Being 
Soonees, every Shiah who falls into their hand is put to death without 
be4J.g reserved for the usual alternative of slavery.6 
Defining an event or specific point in time as the beginning of sectarianism 
is less a question of historical accuracy than one of political narratives. 
Those different narratives are strategic representations of and about religious 
communities (as weil as about state and religious institutions) that are being 
used to mobilize public and official opinion, for example in order to support 
the demand for the full integration of Gilgit-Baltistan into Pakistan. 
Many people in the area attribute sectarianization to outside influences 
like the 'Sunni Mullahs' in Biddulph's quote. Sectarianization is intimately 
related to a process of 'Neo-Islamization', i.e. a process intended to turn 
'nominal' Muslims into 'good', observant Muslims. According to historical 
sources, Neo-Islamization started at least in 1842 when a Sikh anny under the 
Muslim general Nathu Shah conquered the area. Frederic Drew, an English 
geologist in the service of the Maharaja of Janunu and Kashmir, reported in 
1875 that Nathu Shah, the commander ofthe Sikh army which attacked Gilgit 
in 1842, was eager to replace local syncretism with 'real' Islam: 
[Nathu Shah] acquired over these Dards a great influence, and he 
exerted it to malce 'good Muhammedans' of them, to get them to attend 
more carefully to the forms of their religion. It is a fact that before 
Nathu Shah came (say in 1842) the Astor people used to burn thelr 
dead and not to bury them as Muhanunedans should.' 
Oral history in Gilgit attributes the institutional separation of Shias and 
Sunnis in the city to the Kashmiri governor Sardar Mohanunad Akbar Khan 
who was appointed in spring 1898.8 The story goes that when he was ordered 
by the (Hindu) Maharaja of Janunu and Kashmir to build a Hindu temple on a 
plot in the very center of Gilgit, he quickly asked the citizens to immediately 
build a mosque on that very spot. Being Muslim, he wanted to prevent the 
construction of a temple in Gilgit's center. The mosque was jointly built by 
6 Biddulph 1971: 15. 
7 Drew 1980: 429, seealso Biddulph 1971: 56. 
8 Gilgit Diruy, March 30, 1898; India Office Records L/P&S/7/102. 
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Sunnis and Shias and according to local tradition it was initially also used for 
prayer by both groups. Sometime later, however, Sardar Mohanunad Akbar 
Khan ordered both communities to jointiy build an imambarga for the Shias. 
After that, it is said that Shia and Sunni prayer became separated. 9 This is 
not entirely true as Shias and Sunnis continued to use many places of prayer 
jointly. Many people say that being Shia or Sunni was of little impottance 
then and that one often did not know exactly to which sect another person 
belonged. Yet the story of Sardar Mohanunad Akbar Khan indicates that the 
increasing separation of Shias and Sunnis went hand in hand with spatial 
Separation. For the small place that Gilgit was at the end ofthe 19th centurylo, 
this spatial Separation was considerable: The Sunni mosque was situated in 
the central bazaar area while the Imambarga was built in the quite distant 
ward of Nannihet. 
Subsequently, Neo-Islamization and sectarianization was related to 
distant and different places outside of the area: for Sunnis, the madrasa of 
Deoband in northern Irrdia acquired considerable importance, while for the 
Shias places of learning in Iran became significant. In the first half of the 
20"' century, religious scholars (ulema) from Deoband and from Iran came 
to Gilgit. Men from Gilgit-Baltistan traveled to these places for education 
and retumed as ulema. 11 Over the years, social distance between the sects in 
everyday life increased. It is impossible to date these processes precisely; yet 
people point out that from the late 1960s Shia-Sunni marriages becaroe less 
frequent. Much later, commensality between the sects also became restricted, 
especially when the consumption of meat was involved, as Shias and Sunnis 
have to follow different ritual prescriptions for the butchering of animals. 
This separation was greatly increased by the emergence of violent sectarian 
conflicts. 
Intermittent British colonial references to violence between Sunnis and 
Shias notwithstanding, sectarian relations in Gilgit were overwhelmingly 
peaceful. The first violent event occurred in the month of Muharram of 
1975, when shots were fired from the Sunni Jama Masjid at the Shia Ashura 
processinn (julus) by which the Shias commemorate the martyrdom of the 
Imam Hussain. The Shia julus passed through the center of Gilgit and ended 
9 For more detailed stories about the govemor and the separatlau of Shias and Sunnis 
in Gilgit see Sökefeld 1997: 185f. 
10 At the turn of the century, Gilgit must have measured roughly three by one and a 
half kilometers and the population did not exceed a few thousand people. 
11 Rieck 1995. 
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in Saddar Bazaar, close to the Sunni main mosque. Already in 1972, Sunni 
ulema had protested against the raute of the procession, but the Shias insisted 
on their 'customary right'. in 1975 the Shia procession was fired at from the 
Sunni mosque. Even after this incident the Shias were not ready to change 
the c~urse of the procession and therefore the julus was prohibited by the 
administration for the next tv\To years. Only then the Shias consented to end 
the procession at the (Ismaili) Jamaat Khana Bazaar instead. Once again, 
sectarianization and conflict were related to space and movement. 
The reason why the course of the Shia Ashura procession became locally 
contentious during that particular time is mostly attributed to outside 
influence and to political developments. Gilgit-Baltistan is not a constitutional 
part of Pakistan but, due to the still unresolved Kashmir dispute, a 'disputed 
territory' under the administration of Pakistan. This special status brings 
about a number of political disabilities. For instance, until today the people 
of Gilgit-Baltistan have no right to participate in elections for the National 
Assembly of Pakistan. In spite of the local insurgency against the Kashmiri 
Govemor which terminated Kasluniri rule in November 1947 and aimed 
at the accession of Gilgit-Baltistan with Pakistan, this accession never took 
place in a fulllegal sense. To the contrary, in the first postco!onial decades 
the Pakistani administration largely continued a colonial mode of governing 
Gilgit-Baltistan.I2 While a number of minor events indicated that many 
people in the region were not happy with this state of political affairs, a 
major upheaval occurred in the winter of 1970-1971 when a petty local 
dispute escalated to a popular uprising in Gilgit city; in its course the jail was 
broken and the police station was set on fire. 13 The Gilgit Scouts, the local 
paramilitary troops, did not subdue the protests but, to some extent, sided 
with the protesters. Frontier Scouts from the North-West Frontier Province 
were called in to put an end to the Wlrest. 
Local discourse in Gilgit conventionally explains the subsequent 
development of militant sectarian conflict as a strategy of 'divide and rule', 
employed by the Government of Pakistan: in order to prevent a further joint 
uprising of the local people, non-local 'radical' Sunni ulema were sent to a 
madrasa in Gilgit in order to preach against Shias. Tlrrough this intervention 
allegations that Shias are not 'real Muslims' became more vocal and frequent 
and were reciprocated by the Shias. These Sunni ulema were Deobandis, who 
12 Sökefeld 2005, All 2009. 
13 Sökefeld 1997: 284ff. 
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were much more critical towards the Shia, and gradually Deobandis replaced 
Barelwi maulwis in most mosques of Gilgit. The 'Deobandization' of Sunnis in 
Gilgit was accelerated when General Zia-ul-Haq14 seized power in Pakistan 
and started his politics of Islamization which was much more sympathetic 
with the Deobandi than with the Barelwi model of Sunni Islam and which did 
not take the Shia version of Islam into consideration. Mter the mid-1970s, 
there were minor incidents of sectarian violence. 
Sectarian violence reached a different scale when in May 1988 Sunni 
armed forces (la.shkar) from Diamer and Kohlstarr districts attacked Shia 
villages near Gilgit. More than one hundred people were killed and many 
houses destroyed. In the following years there were many events of sectarian 
violence between Shias and Sllnn.is in which many people were killed, 
although not as many as during the event in 1988. Often, once a Swmi or 
Shia Ieader was killed, retaliation or an almost indiscriminate firing foilowed. 
Suchperiods of violence are recurring, and are locally referred to as 'tensions' 
or 'tension tim es'. This expression captures very weil the pervasive feelings of 
threat, insecurity and fear that grip the city during periods of violence and that 
linger on after actual violence has ceased. Even weeks after a violent episode 
people are hesitant to leave their neighborhoods and desert the bazaar before 
nightfall. Gilgit city has become highly militarized (both by military presence 
and small arms and heavy weapons in civilian households) and tensions are 
often followed by extended periods of curfew and constriction of mobility, 
both within the city and also on the highways. 
After 1988, thinking in sectarian terms became an inevitable premise 
of sociallife in Gilgit. Departing from Charles Taylor's concept of "social 
imaginary", 15 Nosheen Ali speaks of a pervasive "sectarian imaginary" in 
Gilgit:16 the tovvn's society is imagined in sectarian termsandas a consequence 
it is impossible to think and to act without taldng one's own and other's 
sectarian affiliation into accoWlt. In an atmosphere of perceived general 
insecurity, to di:fferentiate between Shia and Sunni became regarded as vital. 
Social relations became largely polarized, which implies both increasing 
14 General Zia-ul-Haq seized power in 1978 through a military coup. He deposed the 
democratically elected Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto of the Pakistan People's 
Party. Zia greatly increased his powers, strengthened the position of the military, 
banned all political parties, disbanded Parliamentary democracy and fastered 
Islamization of the state, society, and economy. His rule reflects the idea of a 
'military-bureaucratic technocracy'. See e.g. Haqqani 2005: 131ff. 
15 Taylor 2004, 2007. 
16 Ali 2010. 
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Separation between the communities and growing cooperation within one's 
own community.17 Many issues that are not 'religious' in itself, are viewed 
from sectarian perspectives and a kind of'sectarian rationality' has developed, 
in which parity of the three sects is of utmost importance. Nosheen All, for 
instance, refers to calls for 'sectarian balance' or so-called 'equal treatment' 
by the general public. For exarnple, if an award is given to a Shia student by 
the university in Gilgit, it is demanded by the public that this needs to be 
balanced by prizes given to a Sunni and an lsmaili student, too.18 
Moving in Sectarianized Spaces 
As Tim Ingold explains, places are created by the intertwining movements 
of different people; by moving along paths, places are knit together}9 
Sectarianization, however, is a process in which the routes and lmots of 
different factions are at least partially untied: Shia and Sunni places, paths 
and movements are increasingly separated. Sectarianization results in a 
growing differentiation of events, places and movements which even leads to 
'no-go-areas'. Although this is not a necessary outcome, violence often occurs 
at locations where Shia and Sunni movements still overlap or intersect-like 
the attacks on Shia travelers on the Karalmrum Highway in the Suruli areas 
of Kohistan and Diarner that happened in 2012 to which we will refer below. 
Even though there are still cross-sectarian relations and affairs today, 
such as weddings or tunerals to which guests are invited and entertained 
regardless of their sect, sociallife has become more and more enclosed within 
the religious communities. Crosscutring ties have lost much significance. 
The growing social polarization of the sects is accompanied by spatial 
differentiation: many families who lived in neighborhoods orvillages in which 
the other sect prevailed moved houses to areas where their own religious 
community lives in a majority. Many settlements are even organized araund 
belanging to a specific area of origin and accordingly to a specifi.c sect, as is 
obvious e.g. in 'Kashrot' (Sunni Kashmiris) as weil as in new Settlements, such 
as Ismaili 'Yasin Colony' or Sunni 'Diamer Colony'. 
The sectarian segregation of residential areas also affects the mobility 
between places both within the region as weil as within Gilgit city. Movement 
17 Sökefeld 1997: 217ff. 
18 Ali 2010: 744f. 
19 Ingold 2009. 
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into the spaces of the 'others' became reduced. Often specific precautions 
and strategies, such as avoiding certain areas, are taken by persans who 
feel particularly vulnerable to sectarian attacks. Particularly in times of 
heightened insecurity following perlods of tension, many people do not go to 
their work places if they happentobe situated in parts of Gilgit dominated by 
the other sect. Trespassing or visiting other valleys also requires considering 
the inhabitants' sectarian affiliation. Swmis feel that they can easily enter 
Ghizer, Diamer, and Astor because they do not have to pass through Shia 
areas while traveling there, while Hunza, Nager and Baltistan are rather 
avoided. Conversely, 'shias can go to Hunza, Nager, Astor and Baltistan, but 
not to Diamer. 
The term that people mostly use when referring to this restriction of 
mobility due to sectarianization is "having become stuck" (phas gaya). It 
refers to the feeling ofbeing trapperl within one's respective ward of the town, 
unable to perambulate Gilgit freely (or having to go a detour) and also having 
limited Options to leave the city. Ismailis who are able to move more or less 
freely in any ward and district, nonetheless frequently discuss this problern 
of restrictions of movement of the other two sects. We want to elaborate 
this by referring to exarnples of the districts of Hunza-Nager and Ghizer. 
Due to the cultural heritage sites of two historical forts and a popular image 
of an enlightened and peaceful society Hunza is the favorite destination for 
Pakistani and foreign tourists. But during an informal interview conducted 
in 2012 Jarneela, a female teacher of Gilgit's Sunni ward Kashrot, points 
out that she and her farnily do not see Hunza as that good a destination as 
do outsiders. Due to Shia Settlements en raute, Hunza seems inaccessible to 
many Sunnis. lnstead, she praises Ghizer, which also has an Ismaili majority 
population, but no Shia settlements to pass. In comparison to Hunza, she 
describes Ghizer as peaceful and as a safe destination for day- and farnily-trips 
for everyone, regardless of sectarian identity: 
J: Timt district is most peaceful-Ghizer. Peaceful and ... ali people 
who want to go out and make firn or want to go to a picnic, they go to 
Ghizer. To Phander, Khalti Lake, and Sher Qila. They want to visit that 
district much more as compared to all other. Not ali people can go to 
Hunza. We [Swmis] can't go there because on the way towards Hunza 
there is [Shia] Nomal; [and also Shia] Nager is there. So Sunnis can't 
go [there]. Ghizer is the most peaceful [area of all] ... Shias also like 
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to go [there]. It's a neutral district. Neither Shia nor Sunni. The people 
are also good. And it's a beautiful area. 
A: But then even if you would go to Hunza- then nothing would happen 
[along the way] in Nager, no? 
J: But people ... there is a chance ... maybe ... A head of police was 
m~dered in that area ... five, six years ago. They were going to HWlZa 
for a picnic, then they went back, then they were ... fired [at]. in 
Nomal, or from that way, on the way back to Gilgit. Nomal or Nager. 
Although he was police head. 
A; But maybe they fired at him because of some other reason. 
J: Because of that ... because he was Sunni. So that's why. 20 
Even small clusters of single-sect villages along the highway or road can be 
perceived as impassable obstacles or as a threat. Indeed though, there is no 
'neutral district', as Jameela c!alms, either. Just like villages of Nomal and 
Nager prevent Sunni travelers from going north, a duster of Swmi villages 
has to be passed on the way to Ghizer, which is often considered an obstacle 
by Shias. This is made obvious by lstiqlal, a Shia employee of the agriculture 
department. While telling about his business trips to Ghizer in 2012 and 
2013 afrer the most recent tensions, he makes efforts to describe his trips 
as unproblematic. Later on though, he indicates that he was driving in a 
government vehicle and points out that this provided him security whereas 
he would not have traveled there in his private car due to the Sunni villages 
on the way.21 
Even so, this does not mean that movement to areas of other sects 
came to a total halt. Business or work-related trips as weil as family visits 
make people move in and through areas which they consider unsafe; but in 
these cases the movement is done consciously and cautiously. Particularly 
government employees transgress boundaries regularly, especially since they 
are frequently transferred to different administrative centers and areas within 
Gilgit-Baltistan, often regardless of sectarian affiliation. Ukewise, travel 
20 In this and other quotations from interviews the interlocutors' speech has been 
edited only very slightly in order to keep the original style of language. 
21 Some families own motorbikes, while few families own a car. Government 
departments and non-governmental organizations provide their higher employees 
vvith vehicles, which can easily be distinguished from other vehlcles by their color 
and type (the Iatest models are white Suzuki Jimny and Potohar). The cars of the 
mostprominent organization are the brand-new white Toyota Hilux pick-up trucks 
of the Aga Khan Development Netw"ork. 
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agents who guide foreign tourists in Gilgit-Baltistan are forced to move within 
the whole region according to their guests' wishes. Many guides perceive this 
as a risk and decide according to the current situation whether they feel able 
to take the responsibility to expose themselves and their guests to such a risk. 
While cancelling some of their tours and losing much of their income, some 
Sururi tour Operators for example reluctantly resumed journeys to Ismaili-
majority popular Hun~a in the summer 2012 and dared to agairr pass the Shia 
areas of Nomal and Nager on the way. 
Analogously, moving araund in Gilgit city became more and more 
difficult, in particular-but not exclusively- during times of'tensions'. After 
sectarian target killings in the autumn and winter of 2011 and throughout 
2013, many people restricted their daily movement within Gilgit city to 'safe' 
routes through areas that are inhabited by people of their own sect. Before 
passing through areas of the other sect, the current situation is evaluated 
and decisions about where to move are made very carefully. Trespassing 
was often conunented upon in conversations and interviews, referring to the 
danger of being recognized by someone of the other sect. lltsan, a Sunni 
employee of the education departrnent points out that he goes to work with 
his government car (like Istiqlal), but nevertheless fears the raute since his 
office borders a Shia mohalla (ward). He remarks: "Yes, I go to work every 
day, but my father is always afraid when I leave and calls me five times a 
day to make sure I am safe." He and other Sunnis try to reduce the danger of 
being targeted by taking a Ionger detour along the River Road that touches 
Sunni neighborhoods, rather than moving along the main road through the 
Shia ward of Khomar. Movement, both by car and on foot, within Gilgit city 
and between localities in Gilgit-Baltistan is to some extent avoided but cannot 
be stopped completely. When moving is necessary, it is done consciously and 
cautiously. 
Unlike other cities that provide a "relative anonymity and frequent 
shifts in surroundings and neighbours", 22 Gilgit is hardly anonymaus and 
movement within and out of the city is easily monitared by citizens as well 
as by law enforcing or other agencies, putting additional strains on movement 
and travel. Although private cars in Gilgit are hardly tagged with markers of 
sectarian affiliation, the town is so small and the number of available roads 
so limited, that any movement of individuals can be monitared easily. Many 
of the attacks of 2012 occurred along the main roads in Gilgit. Even though 
22 Reid 2005: 485. 
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the main roads in Gilgit city are patroiled by anny vehicles and interrupted 
by army checkpoints after roughly every kilometer, they are not considered 
safe. Especially men with prominent positions in govemment departments or 
religious institutions are careful to use specifi.c routes and avoid others. Only 
Ismail~s say that they feel unrestricted where to go and which routes to take. 
Taxi drivers do not restriet thernselves much and take the risk to service all 
parts of the city, regardless of their sectarian affiliation. 
As indicated before, Gilgit city is rmder close monitaring and surveillance 
by the army and police. Army checkpoints (in Gilgit referred to as 'check posts', 
givingthem an air of permanency) have been established at most intersections 
and army and police pick-up trucks patrol the roads. In times of tension this 
surveillance is increased. After curfew had been relaxed again, follo'Wing a 
significant violent incident in April 2012, almost every fifth vehicle on the 
main roads were pickup trucks manned with araund five soldiers carrying 
automatic weapons and a mounted machine gun. In the months following this 
incident many 'check posts' were converted from provisional sandbag posts to 
permanent brick-walled, plastered and white-washed constructions, some of 
which were even decorated with colared light bulbs and barmerettes during 
religious holidays. Cars carrying only male passengers are regularly stopped 
and searched at the 'check posts'. 
Since spring 2013 even public transport locally referred to as 'Suzukis' 
which previously passed freely are checked. Only the 'ladies' seat' in the front 
is spared. Other vehicles with female passengers are so far neither stopped nor 
searched. Women point out that they can overall move more safely through 
the city since so far only men have been targeted. 23 In general, however, 
women are constrained as weil, as they are mostly not allowed to move 
without male company. As Emma Varley observes, during the 2005 sectarian 
tensions, many Surmi men did not even feel able to accompany their wives 
or female relatives to the hospital, afraid of being targeted along the way or 
23 Movement of warnen, especially in and to public areas like main roads and bazaars, 
is restricted anyvvay, due to the idea of keeping pardah, i.e. gender segregation, 
although warnen regularly visit households of their agnate and affine relatives (see 
also Gratz 2006: 639ff.). Due to the costs involved in traveling and the inherent 
feelings of insecurity and fear of assaults, they nevertheless prefer close-distance 
and group visits, and in most cases they have to be accompanied by a male 
family member. Men, however, have traditionally moved more freely in tovvn and 
between districts and often move on their ovvn-although even married men may 
be reprimanded by their parents or wife for roaming around, and may be severely 
scolded by their mothers when they did not return harne before nightfall. 
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within the 'high risk' Shia mohalla where the govermnent hospital is situated. 
"Sunni women were thereby forced to measure their matemal health risks 
against the possibility of husbands or male relatives being injured or kiiled 
while accompanying them to hospitals in Shia mohallas. "24 Thus, effectively 
the movement of both men and women is affected by sectarianization. 
Sectarianization of Public Transport 
Since only a small number of families afford the1r ·own car, most people 
use public transportation such as the Suzukis (small, canvas-covered pick-up 
trucks, Operated and used by all sects) for moving within the city and passeng er 
vans for traveling outside to other places. Besides this, there are also a small 
number of privately owned taxis for transport in the city or between adjoining 
villages. Although the vans that service the routes between the villages and 
valleys can be used by anyone, they are also incorporated in the sectarian 
logics and practices. A van's number plate indicates a certain area of origin, 
as do the travel agent, the destination and the bus stand. Thus vans, too, are 
sometimes associated with a specific place and sect. Such information may 
be used to identify vehicles for targeting along the roads, as for exarnple 
when a van going from Gilgit to Hararnosh was Struck by a bomb hidden in a 
drainage charmel under the road during Rarna2an 2012. Although it was not 
clear who had planted the bomb, people observed and discussed that it was a 
Shia coaster carrying Shia passengers being hit at a Sunni village. 
In 2012, sectarian violence led to an attempt to further segregate public 
transport. Two Suzuki-routes are operated from the eastem margins of Gilgit 
to the city center. They start in the mixed mohalla of Jutial, pass through 
Shia Khomar and enter the main bazaar through the Stumi Kashrot area. 
These Suzuki-lines are operated and used by passengers of all sects, and 
dispassionately labeled 'number 1' and 'number 2'. In March 2012, however, 
the fact that they are passing through both Shia and Sunni dominated 
areas became regarded as problematic and they were branded as insecure. 
Consequentially, on March 26,2012, Shlas started a new Suzuld-route which 
bypassed Sunni Kashrot and passed through Nagrel instead. It was called 
Panjtan ('number 5'), a reference to the ahl-e bayt, the five members of the 
house of the Prophet Muharomad which are highly revered by Shias: the 
24 Varley 2010: 66. 
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Prophet himself, All, the first Imam, Fatima, Muhammad's daughter and 
Ali's wife, as weil as their sons Hassan and Hussain. Four days later, Sunnis 
established their own raute which led from Jutial via the river road to the 
center, avoiding Shia liliomar. This raute was named Haq char yar ('four true 
comp~ons'), referring to the four Caliphs Abu Bakr, Usman, Umar and Ali, 
who are highiy respected by Surmis, but who, with the exception of Ali whom 
they consider their fi.rst Imam, are not accepted by the Shias as legitimate 
leaders of the umma. Nine days later, the new routes were banned by the 
local Goverrunent an the ground !hat they had been established without 
goverrunental approval. It is said that the Govermnent wanted to prevent a 
further reinforeerneut and institutionalization of sectarian segregation. 
Movement and Sectarian Violence on Travelers 
Sectarianization is not limited to Gi!git, restricting and charmeling movement, 
but also affects places beyond the city. The Karalmrum Highway (KKH), 
celebrated as 'the life-line of Gi!git-Baltistan' which links Pakistan with China, 
is the only all-weather connection that theoretically is open throughout the 
year between Gi!git-Baltistan and down country Pakistan.25 Although the 
KKH is often blocked by Iandslides (and oftentimes even by demonstrators) 
and although there are many accidents, the highway is still more reliable 
and accessible than the expensive and erratic air service between Gilgit and 
Islarnabad. 
Haines argues that by 'opening up' the mountain area through the KKH 
Pakistan enacted an idea of modemity and created an instrument for national 
development and trade. 26 N ow, more than three decades after the completion 
of the road, Gi!git-Baltistan is highiy dependent on the import of food and 
other goods from Pakistan and China. The movement of people on the road 
has also increased manifold; people travel from Gllgit to Jslarnabad or vice 
versa due to employment, education, or family visits. Traveling and trade on 
the KKH has become indispensable; but as people in Gilgit often complain 
25 Cf. Allan 1989. The road via the Babusar Pass also connects Islamabad and Gilgit. It 
is shorter than the KKH, but only open from May to October and is not convenient 
for trucks. 
26 Haines 2012: 7. 
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that the road <;~.t the sametime enables an increased influx of suspect and alien 
persans from other parts of Pakistan. 27 
During tensiom, the authorities often close the KKH in order to prevent the 
proliferation of violence. In recent years, the road itself has however become 
a stage for sectarian violence. In January 2005, the Imam of the main Shia 
mosque in Gilgit, Agha Ziauddin, was killed and his assassination triggered a 
prolonged period of violence with many victims. Gilgit was put under curfew 
and the roads were initially blocked. Four months later, on April 28, 2005, 
a vehicle was attacked in Diamer, sixteen passengers were wormded and the 
Shia driver killed. 28 On July 17, 2005, a bus going to Rawalpindi was stopped 
on the KKH near Chilas, five passengers were killed and six woWlded. 29 
Seven years later, in 2012, such attacks on the roads between Gilgit and 
downMcountry Pakistan occurred again and lead to prolonged periods of 
restricted movernent and commwtication in and araund the focal point Gi!git 
city. In three incidents buses were stopped, the passengers were ordered to 
leave the vehicles and the identities of the male passengers were checked by 
the assailants who searched for Shia men. In one case, the killing of travelers 
was a reaction to preceding violence. All three cases Iead to more violence in 
Gilgit and other places in Gi!git-Baltistan. 
The Kohistan Incident 
The first incident took place along the KKH at Rarban Das, the last vlllage of 
Khyber-Palthtunkhwa province, bordering with the Diarner District of Gi!git-
Baltistan on February 28, 2012,just after 8 a.m. Men in armyuniforms stopped 
three coasters and one bus with altogether aroWld one hWldred passengers on 
the way from Rawalpindi to Gilgit and killed fifteen Shia men and one Ismai!i. 
Random pieces of information and rurnors about this incident spread in Gi!git 
roughly one hour later. 
Since retaliatory violence was feared in the town, schools, offices and 
shops started to close. In Nomal and in various villages in Nager on the KKH 
leading north from Gilgit, Shias burnt tires and erected barricades. Here, 
vehicles were stopped and searched for Sunni passengers, while at the same 
time Sunni contractors and laborers working in Nager were taken into safe 
27 Sökefeld 1999. 
28 Ahmed 2012: 197. 
29 Dawn retrieved 21.07.2005, cited after Varley 2008. 
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custody by locals in order to protect them. In Gilgit, around noon, one Sunni 
was shot. Different groups of protesters raised slogans against Sunnis, against 
the Chief Minister of Gilgit-Baltistan (a Shia), the Government, and the 
Pakistani Arrny. Subsequently, the Govemment imposed Section 144 (ban of 
publk assembly), and control was handed over to the Paldstan Rangers and 
Gilgit-Baltistan Scouts, giving them the right to shoot-on-sight. The Gilgit-
Baltistan Govemment announced three holidays and asked the people to stay 
at home if possible. Later on, Shias began to hold organized protests and 
demanded the payment of compensation to the families of the victims. The 
Sunni inhabitants of Diamer blocked the highway to prolest "against the use 
of their territory for the heinaus killings. "30 
The Chilas Incident 
Four weeks after the February incident, on March 28, 2012, two Sunni Ieaders 
were arrested in ordertobe interrogated about the February bus attack. Two 
days earlier the new Shia Suzuki-line had been established in Gilgit, followed 
by the introduction of a Sunni Suzuki-line short after. In the following days, 
Sunnis in Gilgit andin Chilas, the capital of the Diamer district south of Gilgit, 
protested against the arrest of their leaders and Shias protested against the ban 
of the new Suzuki-lines which the Government had announced immediately 
after their creation; public transport in Gilgit and on the KKH was blocked. 
On April 3, a hand grenade exploded at a Sunni demonstration in Gilgit, 
killing two and wounding forty-five persons. The incident triggered firing 
throughout Gilgit. Rumors about attacks on both Sunnis and Shias in Gilgit 
started to be spread by text messages. 31 
30 The Express Tribune 2012a. 
31 According to an unreleased police report, ten people in total were killed (among 
them two Ismailis, tv.ro Shias and four Sunnis) and forty-five (forty-two Sunni and 
three Shia) wounded on that day in Gilgit alone. In retaliation for the Shia casualties, 
araund thirty~four Sunnis were taken hostage in Nager. One Sunni was killed in 
Nager and one in Hunza. According to police reports, araund tvventy-tvvo people lost 
their lives and forty~seven were wounded in the whole of Gilgit~Baltistan on that 
day. At the same time, just like historical events are interpreted and framed within 
certain narratives, such figures are also subject to a 'politics of numbers'. Gathering, 
interpreting and publicizing figures is always subjected to various influences, as weil 
as to narrative adjustment 
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At the same time, Sunnis protested in Chilas as well. When news about 
the blast in Gilgit reached the protesters, they decided to march towards 
Gilgit-reminiscent of the 1988 attack by the lashkar, the Sunni armed forces. 
About twenty kilometers from Chilas, around forty men gathered on the KKH 
near Bunar Das and stopped a convoy of five buses with around five hundred 
passengers on the way from Rawalpindi to Gilgit. The passengers were forced 
to descend from the buses and Shia men were singled out and killed. 32 Three 
buses were set on fire. 33 In the same vein as the earlier incident at Harban, 
the assailants selected the Shias by three criteria: firstly, they checked their 
identity cards for Shia names; secondly, they checked whether their place of 
residehce was in Shia villages and wards; finally, they searched the upper 
part of their bodies for flagellation-marks from Ashura processions. Twenty-
five policemen who accompanied the convoy-a security measure introduced 
after the earlier incident-were present but did not intervene, possibly for 
fear of being outnumbered and not being able to control the situation. Some 
Shias could hide among Sunni and lsmaili passengers, who were brought to 
nearby houses from where they were later on collected by the police and the 
army and brought to Gilgit. In the night the Govemment blocked the mobile 
phone networks and imposed curfew on Gilgit, restricting the movement 
within the city, but in effect also between the valleys. 
In the aftermath, many Gilgit neighborhoods were searched for weapons 
and more than eighty men were arrested-according to one interlocutor, all 
of them had already been on a Government blacldist. A special force of four 
hundred soldiers, rangers and policemen was deployed by the Government on 
the KKH to patrol around-the-ciock between Gilgit and Basari, the last village 
of Gilgit -Baltistan before entering the border to Rhyber Pakhtunkhwa. 34 Gilgit 
remairred under curfew for twenty-six days and the two main mosques of the 
32 Some Shia men were scared and ran towards the Indus River where four d.rowned. 
Nine men were shot and one woman died from a heart attack. 
33 The buses of the biggest provider of overland traffic, the Goverment's Northem 
Areas Transport Gorparation (NATCO), were also stopped but not set on fire. 
Although most bus service providers are not sectarianly specialized, one provider 
called 'Masherbrum' is said to belang to a Shia, and mostly used by Shias. These 
were the buses that have been set on fire. 
34 The joint jirga of Diamer had also affered the local govemment to guarantee the 
security on the KKH in Diamer. They proposed that they would ensure this with the 
help of two Jeeps and the necessary petrol and asserted that the youth of Diamer 
would take over the responsibility to prohibit any such events in future. The offer 
was turned down by the Govenunent though, and instead army was employed to 
patrol the highway. 
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town were closed for fifty-three days. During the first days of the curfew, 
movement within the city was completely banned. Food and water supply, 
access to fields, water channels, offices, businesses, banks and health and 
educational facilities was greatly disturbed, jeopardizing the ill and putting 
many people, especially daily wagers, under economic pressure. Later, the 
curfew was lifted for some hours every few days and from the third week on 
it was !ifted during daytime so that people could resume their work. 
Although the convoy system had failed to protect the travelers, it continues 
to be practiced, resulting in much-lamented prolongation of travel time. 
The Babusar Incident 
During the summer of 2012, after the curfew had been lifted at the end of 
April, tension decreased in Gilgit. Ramazan, the Muslim month of fasting, 
started on July 21. During Ramazan only m.inor incidents ofviolence occurred 
in and around Gilgit. People Started to focus on the concluding holiday of 
Eid, fearing more violence during the festivities. Four days before Eid the 
four big re!igious parlies in Gilgit-Baltistan (Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam/JUI-F, 
Maj!is Wahdat-ul Muslimeen/MWM, Jamat-e-Islami/Jl and the Shia Ulema 
Council/SUC) formed the Aman Committee (peace committee) and vowed to 
promote sectarian harmony in Gilgit-Baltistan. 
One day later, on August 16, buses were again attacked; this time vehicles 
going from Gilgit to Rawalpindi via the Babusar Pass. Assailants in army 
wrifonns stopped the buses with a roadblock of stones; Shia passengers were 
forced to descend and were shot. Two protesting Sunni passengers were also 
killed. Later, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan clairned the responsibility for 
the attacks on the Shias. 35 After this incident it was rumored that even the 
intelligence agencies reckoned with another attacl< during Eid. In Gilgit, 
most shops remained closed. While normally on Eid people busily visit their 
relatives and friends, most people visited only family members in their close 
vicinity and postponed other visits because they feared trave!ing and getting 
stuck in someone else's house. On the second day of Eid, firing started in 
Gilgit. Some people were ldiled in Sakwar, Khomar and Kashrot. For the next 
two days people were waiting for curfew to be imposed and mostly stayed at 
home, discussing the situation via their mobile phones. 
35 The Express Tribune 2012c. 
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Repercussions of the Violence on the Road 
In ail three cases, the law enforcement agencies had problems to identify 
and arrest the attackers. The assailants of February and April were later on 
identified as men from Diamer and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa who had vowed 
revenge for earlier target killings of Sunnis. They had apparently been 
trained and supported by Tehreek-e-Tailban Pakistan (TIP) and Jundullah, 
an Islamist militant group associated with the TIP.36 Apparently those who 
were involved in the grenade blast in Gilgit in April could be identified by 
CCTV cameras which had been installed in the bazaar in winter 2011. 
After the attacks, the highway remained closed for all travelers for several 
weeks. The closing greatly disturbed the mobility and the Jives of the people 
of Gilgit-Baltistan. Even though the restrictions irnposed on traffic by the 
authorities were always lifted again, there were Ionger-lasting repercussions 
on the practices of people. 
Following the incidents, people were extremely hesitant to travel on the 
KKH. Many buses left Gilgit half empty and therefore the travel agencies 
reduced the number of vehicles. If movement was not absolutely necessary, 
people preferred to stay at home. Those who had to travel tried to catch a 
plane even though the airfare was repeatedly increased. Due to the run on 
air tickets and frequent unfavorable weather conditions, people often had to 
wait foraticket for many days or even weeks when flights were either hooked 
out or canceled. 37 
The restriction of travel experienced by the people was clearly 
sectarianized. While Shias became absolutely hesitant to travel on the 
Highway between Gilgit and Islarnabad, in order to avoid the Sunni areas of 
Diamer and Kohistan!Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Sunnis for some time avoided 
traveling north, fearing the Shia area of Nager. Yet, while very few Sunnis 
actually have to travel north from Gilgit, Shias in general cannot completely 
avoid traveling south, as going to Islamabad is required for many purposes. 
While lsmaills had not been directly threatened they also feel insecure and 
some of them still employed another strategy. Ismallis generaily bear the 
36 The Express Tribune 2012b. 
37 Pakistan International Airlines has scheduled one to two flights accommodating 
around fifty passengers from Gilgit to Islamabad every day. These flights require 
good weather conditions since the small aircrafts are navigated on visual flight-the 
cancellation rate is around 45 percent. See Japan International Cooperation Agency 
and Government of Gilgit-Baltistan 2010: 39. 
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same names as Shias and fear to be mistakeo for Shias. Many Ismaili travelers 
therefore resorted to carrying fake ideotity cards with unequivocally Sunni 
names and Sunni places of residence. Such conceahnent of one's O'Wll religious 
belonging-called takiya-is also permitred in Shia lslam.38 Yet, because 
many Shia men are marked by the scars of flagellation on their bodies this 
particclar strategy might not necessarily work for them. For Ismailis, travel 
on the KKH is sectarianized also in another way: There are a few hotels 
and restaurants owned by Ismailis along the road in Kohistan and Diamer 
districts. Ismailis traveling by individual vehicles invariably have their breaks 
at these and avoid stopping at Swmi places. 
Sectarianization, Space and the Weakness 
of the Strong State 
Local discourse routinely, but often also contradictorily, implicates the state 
and govenunent in the process of sectarianization. In Pakistan, the state is 
said to be both strong and utterly weak at the same time. To some extent 
this paradox dissolves into an Opposition betvveen state and government: the 
state is conceived of as 'the establishment', consisting of the army and the 
bureaucracy, while the 8:ovemment consists of elected, temporary power 
holders. Here, the state is conceived of as being much stronger than the 
government, as the government does not have the power to oppose the army 
or the bureaucracy. This is particularly pertinent in the case of Gilgit-Baltistan 
where the administrative bureaucracy is deputed by the federal Government, 
while the local Government under the Chief Minister on!y enjoys limited 
competences. Yet this distinction is not always made in daily discourse and 
often 'state' and 'government' are used synonymously. 
According to local discourse, sectarianization and in particular the recent 
ambushes on the KKH expose either the wealmess ofthe state or its complicity 
in sectarian violeoce-or both. Wehave already pointed out that the beginning 
38 Bodily markers, such as dress or style, may also indicate one's belanging to a specific 
community. The color black for example is mainly assigned to Shias. Many Shia 
women wear black intentionally, while Ismaili women deliberately avoid black 
clothes or accessories. In spite of this though, Sunni women may wear black for 
fashion. In contrast, such markers may on the other hand be used strategically for 
'sectarian impression management' in order to clivert conspicuousness. For example, 
while Sunni men are asked by their religious leaders to grow a lang beard, some say 
that they intentionally shave clean in order to pass as an Ismaili. 
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of sectarian violence in the 1970s is ofteo explained as the state's effort to 
control Gilgit-Baltistan through a strategy of 'divide and ruie' that pitted 
Sunnis agairrst Shias. As the area's political status has not fundameotally 
changed since then-Gilgit-Baltistan has neither been fully integrated into the 
Pakistani state nor has it enjoyed full autonomy-this situation persists until 
now. People in Gilgit frequently hold the state's 'agencies', i.e. the security 
institutiOIJß, responsible for sectarian attacks. In two of the ambushes, the 
attackers used the state's symbols, i.e. army uniforms. Furthermore, the state 
itself is often considered as being sectarian and biased. 
Indeed, sectarian conflict sometimes arises from state policies, as was the 
case with the 'textbook controversy' in which the Shias protested against the 
Sunni bias of textbooks that were used in Gilgit's schools and which resulted 
in a period of massive sectarian violence in 2005.39 Sectarian violence against 
Shias is not limited to Gilgit; but is endemic also in other regions of Pakistan, 
most importantly in Jhang district in southem Punjab, the Khurram Agency 
in Khyber Palthtunkhwa and, more recently, Quetta in Baluchistan. Shias 
often consider Paldstan a Stumi (and, by implication, an anti-Shia) state. 
Gilgit-Baltistan is the on!y !arger political eotity of Pakistan with a majority 
Shia population. In Gilgit even Stumis sometimes explain sectarian violence 
as the state's strategy to put Shias in their (subaltern) place, as does Hafeez, 
a local Sunni academic, who stated: 
The Shia Muslims in this time are stronger in Gilgit city than Sunni and 
other communlties. Whatever the Shia want, they can do. In Gilgit city 
especially. Whatever! The Government failed in front of their coalition. 
All the agencies failed. So, ISI [Inter-Services Intelligence, the army's 
biggest security agency] has totally failed, totally failed in the Shia 
areas. Nobody is ready to work with !SI, MI Military Intelligence 
[inteiligeoce arm of the Pakistan Army], [or the] Special Forces in 
Gilgit-Baltistan, so, when they failed they tried to ... they wanted to 
make the Ahie-ta-Shia realize that they are stuck in Gilgit city. In the 
Kohistan incident the basic theme was that the Shia are stuck in Gilgit 
city. They cannot do anything. Whenever the Government wants, the 
Government desires, it can demolish the Ahle-ta-Shias. Because they 
don't have any route. The routes are only for Ismailia and the Sunnis. 
Kohistan is also Sunni, Skardu is Shia - but Skardu does not have any 
39 Stöber 2007, Ali 2008. 
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routes [leading out) - Gilgiti Shias can only go by air. But the airport 
in Gilgit is located in the Sunni Kashrot area, Ahle-ta-Swma area, so, 
the Government showed: you are stuck in Gilgit city. So you realize 
that ... what do we say ... you don't show your power in front of the 
Government! 
Hafeez directly links the Government's effort to control the Shias with 
the sectarianization of space and the blocking of the Shias' movement 
and mobility. Here, the sectarianization of space is referred to as the 
Government's last resort to control the Shias. Since other means to control 
the Shias have failed, sectarian violence rather exposes the weakness of 
the state, even if in Hafeez' view the Government is able to "demolish" 
the Shias. The inconsistency of Hafeez' Statement is quite typical for local 
discourse about sectarianization. 
For those people who do not assume the state's complicity in sectarian 
violence, the state's weakness is exposed even more obviously: all efforts 
and instruments to protect citizens and ensure travelers' security have failed. 
Most of the state's efforts to prevent sectarian violence also targeted both 
movement and space. The imposition of curfew in Gilgit town intended to 
prevent further violence by tying the people to their homes. Heavily armed 
army patrols plied the streets of Gilgit and they continued to do so even 
after curfew was lifted. For several years now, army bunkers keep watch at 
important crossroads in town and new checkpoints have been established 
where vehicles are frequently stopped and searched. CCTV carneras have been 
installed at pivotal places in Gilgit in order to generally monitor movement 
in the town, although much to the dismay of many, they are rather often out 
ofwork.40 
Such "spatializing strategies" of control41 are not limited to Gilgit town 
but also extend to the KKH. After the Kohistan incident additional police 
stations were established along the hlghway. Buses are not allowed to move 
independently any more but have to form convoys with often more than 
twenty vehicles that are accompanied by police guards. However, while these 
measures produce hardships for travelers who often have to wait for hours 
for the formation of convoys as well as for the logistics of escorting, they did 
not prevent the subsequent attacks on Shlas on the road. To the contrary, 
40 Pamir Times 2012a. 
41 Cf. Merry 2001. 
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during the Chilas incident in April2012, a whole convoy was stopped by the 
assailants and policemen simply watched Shias being killed and fire being 
set to buses. 
The Govenunent's prohibition of the new, sectarianized public Suzuki-
routes in Gilgit which were immediately abandoned was more efficient. Yet, 
this was an easy task compared to ensuring safety on the KKH. Many people 
lamented the introduction of the new routes as a further sectarian division 
of public space. A commentator wrote on the news-blog Pamir Times: "Local 
people should vocaliy demanded [sie) of the Government and administration 
to take notice of the situation and stop the process of systematic segmentation 
of the society. "42 Others, however, regarded the new routes as measures of 
protection in view of the Govenunent's inability to provide security, and thus 
as a sign and consequence of the Government's wealmess. 
Blaming the Government as weak and/or complicit also helps to exonerate 
local society from responsibility for sectarianization and violence. There is 
a strong local irnaginary and narrative that people in Gilgit are essentially 
peaceful and live in 'sectarian harmony'. Thus, the commentary from Pamir 
Times quoted above maintains that "the residents of Gilgit city have a history 
of living tagether peacefully, despite of believing in different interpretations 
of Islam and there seems to be no reason why they shali not move back 
towards that era of harmony and peace. "43 According to local discourse, 
this sectarian harmony is unfortunately and maliciously disturbed time and 
-time again by acts of inter-sectarian violence perpetrated by outsiders or by 
'foreign hands'. 44 Yet, the incidents of violence also provide the stage for 
inter-sectarian sympathy and bravery. Thus, it is recounted how during the 
Chilas incident some Shlas could hide among Ismailis, who passed them as 
kin, and were later protected by sympathetic Swmis in their houses. Other 
stories teil how in Hunza a Shia hotel owner hid a group of Sunni traders 
and their farnilies in his hotel, protecting them from ralding Shia youth, or 
how Ismaili villagers in Gojal hid Swmi workers for days in their homes in 
order to protect them when the wrath and revenge of Shia raiders from Nager 
was feared. Here, too, violence and protection are intimately connected with 
42 Pamir Times 2012b. 
43 Ibid. 
44 The Opposition of locals/people of Gilgit versus people from outside who are held 
responsible for many social evils isadominant mode of identification in Gilgit. See 
Sökefeld 1997. 
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issues of place and space: People are in danger because they are in the 'wrong' 
place and they are protected by putting them in safe places. 
Such accounts are supportive of a narrative of essentially friendly 
relationships between the sects and the condemnation of violence which 
disturps the sectarian harmony in the area. As Fregonese narrates for Beirut, 
one can also find a "double imaginary of openness and closure [ which] 
is constantly reproduced and negotiated"45 in Gilgit. The discourse about 
Gilgit's and Gilgit-Baltistan's inhabitants' 'true nature' constantly oscillates 
betvveen praise for openness, interaction, and hospitality on the one hand, and 
regret of closure, fragmentation, and hostility, on the other hand. Further, the 
narrative of Sunnis protecting Shias or Shias protecting Sunnis again exposes 
the weakness of the state: Local people protect others who are in danger, 
while the state is nnable to provide security" for its citizens. 
Conclusion: Dynamics of Sectarianization in Gilgit 
Loosely and rather metaphorically, using Norbert Elias' term we could speak 
about a figuration of sectarianization in Gilgit-Baltistan. From the rather 
specific issue of doctrinal differences between Shia and Sunni Islam, a broad 
field ofinterlocking issues developed that is densely interwoven with everyday 
life in Gilgit-Baltistan. Doctrinal differences had direct impacts on daily life 
in Gilgit, as in the case of Shia-Sunni commensality, which ended more or 
less because one sect's way of slaughtering animals is not accepted as halal 
by the other sect. The most pervasive effects of sectarianization are however 
generated indirectly through violence-actual violence in many cases, but 
also anticipated, expected, imagined and feared violence; we could even say 
that sectarianization is violence. Many of the behavioral manifestations of 
sectarianization can be nnderstood as actors' efforts and strategies to prevent 
and avoid violence. A sectarian logic evolved, which almost invariably 
evaluates social situations and political constellations from sectarian 
perspectives. Individual as well as collective actors and the Government 
adhere to this logic and, because they accept its premises, contribute thereby 
to the further entrenchment of sectarianization. 
In this paper, we showed that sectarianization is intimately connected 
with issues of mobility, space and place. Wehaveseen that from the beginning 
45 Fregonese 2012. 
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sectarianization was closely tied to issues of geography and movement 
Sectarian differentiation in Gilgit was also expressed in the creation of spatial 
distance. Movement and the use of urban places by one sect -the Shias with 
their julw; in the month of Muharram-were the occasion of the first instances 
of sectarian violence. Yet, our focus was not on sectarianization and 'religious 
movements' in the narrower sense; but rather on the sectarianization of 
apparently'religiouslyneutral' movements, on travel withinand beyend Gilgit. 
Wehaveseen that there is no religiously neutral movement and place in and 
around tbe city. The sectarian logic applies to all kinds of places--valleys, 
regions, villages, neighborhoods, markets, streets, etc.-which become 
sectarianly marked and are thus considered as either safe or dangerous. Most 
of the people's strategies to evade and avoid sectarian violence are related to 
the appraisal of places and movement in sectarian terms. 
In his article Against Space Tim Ingold46 challenges the notion that places 
exist in (empty) space, that human existence is essentially place-bound 
and that we move between places. lnstead, he points out that we live as 
"wayfarers", moving along paths and thereby binding places together. Places 
are "knots" where movements of people meet and intertvvine. Drawing on this 
conceptualization we can understand the dynamics of sectarianization as a 
process of partially untying these knots: Shia and Sunni "threads", paths and 
movements are increasingly separated. Shia movements bind Shia plates and 
movement of Sunnis bind Sunni places. Sectarianization results in a highiy 
uneven canvas with large 'holes' and no-go-areas which, however, cannot 
always be completely avoided. Violence occurs mostly at locations where the 
threads of Shia and Swmi movements overlap and intersect. 
This uneven, perforated canvas rmfolds in a political environment 
dominated by a state, which in the eyes of many locals, is itself of sectarian 
character, being either complicit in or too weak to prevent violence and the 
process of further sectarianization. Also the state is not a religiously 'neutral 
space' but intimately implicated in the dynamics of sectarianization. 
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